This paper attempts to determine empirically whether China is taking foreign direct investment (FDI) away from other Asian economies (the "China effect"). A random-effects simultaneous equation model, controlling for the determinants of inward FDI of eight East and Southeast Asian economies over 1985-2001 and using China's inward FDI as an indicator of the China effect, indicates that China's FDI level is positively related to these economies' FDI levels and negatively related to their shares in FDI in Asia. Moreover, openness, corporate tax rates, and corruption can exert a greater influence on these countries' FDI than China's FDI.
Introduction
In recent years, China has become a favorite destination for foreign direct investment (FDI). In 2002, FDI in China reached US$53 billion. For 2003, despite the problems associated with SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome), China received US$54 billion worth of FDI, which was substantially larger than the US$30 billion received by the United States.
Most of China's Asian neighbors are worried about the prospect of China's becoming "the factory of the world." Several Asian governments have publicly noted that China's economic rise and its attractiveness as a location for low-cost export platforms have diverted direct investment away from their economies. Policymakers throughout the region are convinced that the rise of China has contributed to the "hollowing out" phenomenon; that is, foreign and domestic investors have been withdrawing funds and relocating production from their own countries and investing in China instead. This has led to continued loss of manufacturing industries and jobs, further weakening the vitality of these economies. 1 steps to be as competitive as China, the FDI ºows into these economies would be adversely affected. 4 Taiwan's Vice Premier, Lin Hsin-I, said that given the rapid rise of the mainland Chinese economy, Taiwan would have to take effective measures to increase its competitiveness. Taiwan has to implement the "Go South" policy to encourage Taiwanese to switch their investments from the mainland to Southeast Asian countries.
5
What determines FDI ºows into Asian (and other) economies? Is there a China effect? To gain some insight concerning the methodology we should use to answer these questions, in particular the appropriate explanatory variables, we brieºy review some relevant academic literature. Brainard (1997) empirically examines the determinants of the ratio of U.S. export sales to total foreign sales (the sum of exports and sales by foreign afªliates by industry). She uses a framework that focuses on factors that favor concentration of production (i.e., factors that favor export sales) versus proximity to overseas customers (i.e., factors that favor sales by foreign afªliates). The explanatory variables include freight costs to the export market, tariffs of the host country, per capita gross domestic product, corporate tax rates, measures of trade and FDI openness, and measures of plant scale economies and corporate scale economies. She also includes a dummy representing whether a country has experienced a political coup in the last decade. In her random-effects estimation, almost all the variables have the right signs and are signiªcant. The major exception is the corporate tax rate, which has the opposite sign, as predicted. Gastanaga, Nugent, and Pashamova (1998) focus on policy reforms in developing countries as determinants of FDI inºows. They employ both ordinary-least-squares and panel estimations. Expected rates of growth, corporate tax rates, degree of corruption, and degree of openness to FDI are all important determinants of FDI ºows into these economies. Hines (1995) and Wei (1997) both examine the impact of institutional factors on FDI. By employing a corruption index, Hines shows that after 1977, U.S. FDI grew faster in less-corrupt countries. Wei (1997) The basic regression models for inward FDI for the Asian countries and for China are written as linear speciªcations of the following form:
where the subscripts stand for country i at period t. Variables beginning with the letter "A" denote variables of the Asian countries, and those beginning with the letter "C" denote variables of China. The independent variables examined in the analysis are believed to exert an inºuence on inward FDI in each Asian country and in China by changing the investment environment through institutional and policy changes and through economic conditions. The main variable that we examine in this paper is the proxy for the China effect, CHINA_FDI. Two important aspects of increases in China's FDI should be considered in our analysis. First, when multinational enterprises (MNEs) are deciding on a low-wage export platform, they may choose between investing in China and investing in another Asian country, say Thailand. In this case, the MNEs will study a whole set of factors (e.g., wage rates, political risks, and infrastructure) that make a country desirable as a site for low-cost production, and a decision to invest in China will result in a reduction of the FDI in Thailand. The sign of CHINA_FDI, according to this argument, is negative. We call this the investment-diversion effect.
A second aspect of increased FDI in China concerns the production and resource linkages between a growing China and the rest of Asia. In manufacturing, this takes the form of further specialization and increasing fragmentation of the production processes. Suppose that an investor sets up factories in both China and Thailand to take advantage of their respective competitiveness in distinct stages of production. Components and parts are then traded among China and other Asian economies. An increase in China's FDI is then positively related to an increase in Thailand's FDI. A different but complementary argument is that as China grows, its market size increases and its appetite for minerals and resources also increases. Subsequently, foreign ªrms rush into China to produce and sell in China. At the same time, other multinationals invest in other parts of Asia to extract minerals and resources to export to a fast-growing China in need of a whole spectrum of raw materials. This line of reasoning leads one to predict that the sign of CHINA_FDI will be positive. We call this effect the investment-creation effect. Theoretically, we cannot determine a priori the net effect of investment creation and investment diversion for China; this issue must be examined empirically.
A substantial literature conªrms empirically the importance of both the current market size and the growth factor of the host economy, as measured by GDP per capita and GDP growth rate, respectively. Foreign investors that target local markets are assumed to be more attracted to a country with a higher GDP growth rate because it indicates a larger potential demand for their products. The effect of this variable on their investment incentive, therefore, is assumed to be larger than the effect of this variable on the incentive of foreign investors who are not local-market seekers. Furthermore, for foreign investors who operate in industries characterized by relatively large economies of scale, the importance of the host country's current market size and its economy's potential for growth is magniªed. This is because such investors can exploit scale economies only after the market attains a certain threshold size. In our analysis, per capita GDP and growth rate of GDP are used as indicators for current market size and market potential for the products of foreign investors, respectively. Thus the expected signs for these variables are positive.
Because the cost of labor is a major component of the cost function, various versions of wage variables are frequently tested in the literature. A high nominal wage, other things being equal, deters inward FDI. This is true particularly for the ªrms that engage in labor-intensive production activities. Therefore, conventionally, the expected sign for this variable is negative. However, the results of various empirical analyses of the effect of labor cost on investment incentives are not in agreement. Some studies indicate that there is no signiªcant correlation between labor costs and inward FDI, whereas others demonstrate a positive relationship between these variables. The latter result is often attributed to an advanced level of labor productivity or high quality of human capital that may be reºected in the wage variables (e.g., cases in which highly skilled labor is actively sought by foreign investors). Our analysis makes use of average wages in the manufacturing sector.
The level of human capital is demonstrated to be an important determinant of the marginal productivity of capital. Various studies show that skill-related variables are host-country speciªc. When a host country is more appealing to foreign investment in production that requires a relatively low level of skills, the importance of the human capital variable tends to be small. Labor skills can be a more signiªcant factor for a host country in which more capital-and technology-intensive investment projects are concentrated. In this analysis, we utilize the illiteracy rate as a proxy for the level of human capital.
We examine the hypothesis that better-developed regions with a superior quality of infrastructure are more attractive to foreign ªrms relative to others by including in our regressions a proxy for developed infrastructure, the number of telephone mainlines per 1,000 people.
We also examine the signiªcance of institutional factors in the determination of FDI by incorporating indexes of the level of corruption and of the stability of each government into the regressions. Corruption can discourage FDI by inducing a higher cost of doing business. Hines (1995) shows that FDI originating from the United States grew more rapidly in less-corrupt countries than in more-corrupt countries after 1977. Wei (1997) presents an alternative explanation of the large negative and signiªcant effect of corruption on FDI. Unlike taxes, corruption is not transparent and involves many arbitrary factors. The agreement between a briber and a corrupt ofªcial is hard to enforce and creates more uncertainty about the total questionable payments or the ªnal outcome. Wei demonstrates that this type of uncertainty induced by corruption leads to a reduction in FDI. The political stability of a government can be another important factor in fostering the inºow of FDI. Uncertain political environments and their related risks can impede FDI inºows in spite of favorable economic conditions. Because the indexes of corruption and instability assign higher scores to less-corrupt or more-stable countries, the expected signs of the variables ACORRUPT and AGOV are positive.
Also included in the analysis are policy-related variables: tariff barriers (proxied by import duty), corporate tax rates, and openness to foreign trade. The effect of tariffs on the behavior of MNEs is methodologically demonstrated by Horst (1971) . He predicts that in the face of higher tariffs imposed by the host countries, other things being equal, MNEs will increase their production abroad and decrease their exports. More recent models highlight the effect of tariffs on FDI in the context of vertical and horizontal specialization within MNEs. An MNE engaged in vertical FDI typically organizes its individual afªliates so that they specialize in different stages of production of the output, and semi-ªnished products in turn are exported to other afªliates for further processing. By fragmenting the production process, the parent organizations and their afªliates take advantage of factor price differentials across countries. FDI by an MNE with horizontal specialization, on the other hand, involves the MNE's afªliates' being engaged in similar types of production. An MNE engaged in horizontal FDI is generally associated with market-seeking behavior and its motivation is to avoid trade costs. The choice between engaging in horizontal FDI or exporting involves comparing the relative advantages of minimizing trade costs with the savings resulting from economies of scale.
The MNEs that utilize vertical production networks might ªnd it beneªcial to invest in countries with relatively low tariff barriers because this would result in lower costs for their imported intermediate products. Therefore, in this case the expected sign of ADUTY is negative. In contrast, MNEs engaged in horizontal FDI would likely regard high tariff barriers as an incentive to replace their exports with production abroad by their foreign afªliates (Brainard 1997; Carr, Markusen, and Maskus 2001) . Such tariff-jumping would imply a positive relationship between ADUTY and FDI.
AOPEN is included in the regressions to examine the importance of openness of an economy to international trade. This variable measures the degree of general trade restrictions of each country. Following the same line of reasoning above, a negative relationship between openness and market-seeking FDI is expected, and a positive relationship is expected for export-oriented FDI.
Another policy-related variable that can inºuence the host country's location advantage is the host country's corporate (or other) tax rates. The MNEs, as global proªt maximizers, can be assumed to be sensitive to tax factors, because taxes have a direct effect on their proªts. Evidence for signiªcant negative inºuences of corporate tax rates is reported in Wei (1997) , Gastanaga, Nugent, and Pashamova (1998), and Hsiao (2001) .
All variables are transformed into logarithms. Data sources and additional explanations of variables are given in appendix A.
In our estimations, we assume for each FDI equation that there is a collection of factors that are omitted from the regression, and these factors are speciªc to each individual country. Therefore, we estimate equations that take the following form:
where the disturbance term, ⑀ it , is associated with both time and the cross-sectional units, and i is the random disturbance that is associated with the ith country and is assumed to be constant through time. In other words, the country-speciªc constant terms are assumed to be randomly distributed across the cross-sectional units.
The formulation of the model is speciªed as follows.
where X and Z are vectors of explanatory variables from equations (1) and (2), respectively; e i,t and w i,t are disturbance terms, and u i and v i are the individualcountry-effect terms. The above simultaneous equation system is estimated by a two-stage least-squares regression (2SLS). Table 1 shows the results from the ªrst set of random-effects simultaneous regressions using the levels of FDI inºows as the dependent variables. To avoid a multicollinearity problem, variables that are highly correlated are not included simultaneously. Therefore AWAGE, AINCOME, ATEL, and AOPEN are not all included at the same time in the same speciªcations. For each of the dependent variables, there are ªve speciªcations. Speciªcation (1) includes AWAGE but not ATEL and AINCOME (column 1). In speciªcation (2), we look at the effect of ATEL and leave out AWAGE and AINCOME. Speciªcation (3) examines ATEL by additionally excluding AOPEN because of its moderate correlation with ATEL. The effect of AINCOME is studied in speciªcations (4) and (5) Our main variable of interest, CHINA_FDI, is positive and highly signiªcant in all speciªcations. A 10-percent increase in the FDI inºows to China would raise the level of FDI inºows to the eight East and Southeast Asian countries by about 5 to 6 percent, depending on the particular speciªcation. Despite considerable concerns in policy circles that an increase in FDI inºows to China is at the expense of other regional economies, our study shows that these economies can actually beneªt from such increases in FDI. This result may be linked to the production-networking activities among Asian countries as well as to the increased demand for resources by a growing China. The evidence for production networking among China and other Asian economies can be found in the substantial two-way trade of intermediate and ªnal goods in the same industries among those countries. These economic ties of mutual dependence have been deepening rapidly since the 1990s, and the signiªcance of the China effect to our Asian countries' FDI inºows may reºect such interdependence. In sum, our empirical study shows that an increase in China's FDI is positively and signiªcantly related to FDI inºows in other Asian economies. Our central result is that the investment-enhancing effect dominates the investmentdiversion effect, so that on net China is a positive force for FDI inºows into other Asian economies.
Results

Regressions using levels of FDI inºows
The effect of openness, denoted by the variable AOPEN, has the expected positive sign and is always signiªcant (when included in the regressions). Openness captures the degree of both tariff and non-tariff measures, including trade impediments. In contrast to the effect of tariff barriers (proxied by the variable ADUTY), the impact of openness to trade on the inºow of FDI is substantial. The results in table 1 suggest that, other things being equal, the marginal effect of trade liberalization of the Asian countries on their FDI inºows is approximately twice as large as that of the China effect. Trade impediments can take various forms, such as local content requirements, technology transfer requirements, and domestic sales and export requirements. Our results imply that reductions in these types of trade barriers can play a vital role in promoting FDI in the Asian countries.
Corporate tax is another variable that is found to exert a large inºuence on the level of FDI inºows in this analysis. Although many countries offer various forms of tax incentives for foreign investors, corporate tax rates can be considered one of the most inºuential tools to promote investment because they have a direct impact on the proªtability of foreign investment projects.
Unlike the results of many previous studies, our analysis suggests that the growth rate of GDP does not play an important role in attracting FDI. Per capita income, however, is found to be a signiªcant factor, but only in speciªcation (5). This seems to suggest that foreign investors' decisions to invest in Asia are more sensitive to current market size than to the market potential for their products.
Infrastructure in the form of communications infrastructure, as roughly measured by ATEL, is signiªcant in speciªcation (3) but not in speciªcation (2) because ATEL is moderately correlated with AOPEN. Communications infrastructure appears to be a favorable characteristic for foreign investors, in terms of the magnitude of its effect, but other key variables in the equation overshadow its inºuence.
Notwithstanding its insigniªcance in almost all of the speciªcations, ADUTY reveals its marginally negative effect on FDI in speciªcation (3). Many of the East and Southeast Asian countries examined here are heavily involved in vertical specialization, particularly in the electric and electronics industries. This vertical network is evident in the share of two-way trade in the same industry in the total volume of trade among these Asian nations. A reduction in tariff barriers can stimulate FDI in the host country by lowering the costs associated with intra-ªrm input trade.
The relatively large positive effect of illiteracy on FDI found in speciªcations (3) and (5) is puzzling. One possible reason for this relationship is that FDI in the region tends to seek out cheap labor, which is often correlated with high rates of illiteracy.
In the literature, the degree of government instability and the index of corruption are found to be always negatively associated with the level of FDI. However, neither of these institutional factors (the AGOV or ACORRUPT variables) appears to have an important effect in speciªcations (1) to (5). In other words, corruption or government instability is unlikely to have signiªcantly discouraged FDI in this group of countries. Table 1 shows the results of the basic core set of our empirical exercises. We also explore alternative ways and robustness checks of testing for the China effect and in the following sections report the results of regressions that (1) exclude Hong Kong from the sample; (2) deªne the dependent variable as the eight East and Southeast Asian countries' shares in FDI inºows to Asia; and (3) include a new variable, the total global supply of FDI (OUTFLOW).
Regressions without Hong Kong
Investment from Hong Kong to China has increased dramatically since the early 1980s, and Hong Kong is by far the largest foreign investor in China at present. However, it has been frequently claimed that a signiªcant portion of such invest- (table 2) . The importance of establishing a large market is also evident. Corruption appears to have a larger and more signiªcant inºuence on FDI inºows when the panel is analyzed without Hong Kong. This may be attributed to the fact that Hong Kong demonstrates the lowest level of corruption on average among all countries examined. The importance of the variable may be higher among corrupt economies.
Regressions using countries' FDI shares in FDI inºows to Asian countries
We use a country's share of FDI that goes to Asia as the dependent variable in equation (3) of the model to see whether an increase in China's FDI diverts FDI away from the group, reducing their share of total FDI inºows to Asia. Note that the dependent variable in equation (4), for China, is still the level of China's FDI. One might use China's share of the total FDI inºows to Asia rather than the level of China's FDI. However, between 1985 and 2001, FDI in China and the eight East and Southeast Asian countries accounted for 89 percent of the total FDI inºows to Asia. Thus, an increase in China's share of total FDI inºow to Asia would almost certainly ensure a reduction in the East and Southeast Asian countries' share of total FDI inºow. To avoid this, we continue to use the level of China's FDI inºows in the regressions.
Given that direct investment inºows into China and our eight Asian economies constitute the bulk of direct investment into Asia, 8 it may not be surprising if the regression results show that, out of the total FDI received by Asia, an increase in China's inward FDI reduces an individual country's share. Nonetheless, it is useful to estimate the impact. Our results conªrm that an increase in FDI to China undoubtedly decreases the proportion of FDI that each country obtains. A 10-percent increase in the level of China's FDI causes the East and Southeast Asian countries' shares in FDI to Asia to drop by about 2 to 3 percent. Although a larger share of FDI received by China appears to come at the expense of its neighboring countries, FDI promotion could come from the internal economic policy of each country, such as the level of corporate tax and the degree of openness in foreign trade. The inºuence of openness on FDI is at least twice as large as that of the China effect, and more than four times as large as the China effect in speciªcations (1), (2), and (4). Similarly, the inºuence of corporate taxes on FDI is more than three times as large as that of the China effect.
Also evident from table 3 is the much larger and signiªcant effect of corruption, compared with the effects of this variable as shown in table 1. A 1-percent decrease in the degree of corruption is associated with a 0.25-0.64 percentage increase in the individual share in FDI to Asia, depending on the speciªcation of the equation. Table 4 shows the results of adding to our equations a new explanatory variable, OUTFLOW t , which is the total amount of the global supply of FDI for year t. One potential criticism of our central ªnding that FDI in China is positively related to FDI in the East and Southeast Asian economies is that this correlation could arise simply because inºows to most economies are dictated by the global supply of capital of that year. In other words, if OUTFLOW t increases in year t, FDI inºows to both China and the eight Asian economies are also likely to increase, thereby generating our main result but without demonstrating that it is clearly related to the China effect we wish to investigate. To control for the supply-side effect of FDI and to isolate the estimation of the China effect, we therefore run our panel simultaneous equation model with the addition of the OUTFLOW variable.
Regressions with global supply of FDI
The coefªcients representing the China effect are still positive and signiªcant (table 4) . The magnitudes of the coefªcients, however, are nearly half as large as those in table 1. The OUTFLOW variable is also positive and signiªcant and has a larger coefªcient than that of the CHINA_FDI variable. Other variables that are signiªcant are corporate tax rates, openness, and degrees of corruption. We conªrm again that the China effect is positive. As before, other determinants related to policy, institutions, and the global supply of capital have a stronger effect on the inºows of FDI into these Asian economies.
Conclusion
Is China diverting FDI away from other Asian economies? This is the paramount question on the minds of many academic researchers and policymakers in Asia. Theoretically, China's ability to attract FDI could have both investment-creating effects and investment-diverting effects on Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand. We empirically estimate the determinants of FDI inºows in these economies over the 1985-2001 period. The standard determinants we consider include GDP growth rates, degrees of openness, corporate tax rates, indexes of corruption, degrees of government stability, illiteracy rates, per capita GDP, tariff rates, wage rates, and proxies of infrastructure. To estimate the China effect, we include the level of China's inward FDI as the dependent variable in the econometric equations. We use a random-effects simultaneous equation model to estimate our coefªcients, including the estimation of the coefªcient on the China effect.
The main results of our paper are as follows. First, in terms of the level of FDI ºows, the China effect is positive; that is, FDI inºow to the eight East and Southeast Asian economies is positively related to direct investment in China. Second, in terms of the countries' shares in FDI to Asia, the China effect is negative; that is, although the level of FDI in China and the level of FDI in these eight economies increase together, an increase in China's FDI is associated with a decline in the other economies' share of total FDI inºows to Asia. Third, the China effect is not the most important factor determining the inºows of FDI into these eight East and Southeast Asian economies. Speciªcally, policy variables such as lower corporate taxes and higher degrees of 
